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ABSTRACT: Marcus’s view of belief is applied to the debate that centers on the question, “Are delusions beliefs?” 
Two consequences of this are that i) the question, “Are delusions beliefs?” needs rephrasing and ii) the an-
swer is, “No, some delusional patients do not believe what they prima facie seem to believe”. 
Keywords: belief; delusion; rationality. 
RESUMEN: La concepción de Marcus sobre las creencias se aplica al debate centrado en la cuestión: “¿Son creencias 
los delirios?” Dos consecuencias que se siguen de ello son: i) que la cuestión “¿Son creencias los delirios?” 
necesita reformularse, y ii) que la respuesta es: “No, algunos pacientes que sufren delirios no creen lo que, 
prima facie, parecen creer”. 
Palabras clave: creencia; delirio; racionalidad. 
1. Introduction 
To my mind, few have written as clearly and convincingly on the notion of belief as 
Ruth Barcan Marcus. In this paper, I want to examine what happens when we accept 
her view of belief and apply it to a particular debate in recent philosophical work on 
clinical delusions. The debate in question takes the form of different answers to the 
question: “Are delusions beliefs?” Call this “the doxasticity debate”, or DD for short, 
since the bone of contention is whether delusions are doxastic (viz. beliefs). There are 
two consequences of adopting Marcus’s view of belief in approaching this question. 
One is that this question, “Are delusions beliefs?”, strictly speaking, needs rephrasing. 
The current phrasing reflects the fact that many of the main participants in the DD 
subscribe to a view of belief that Marcus opposed. The second consequence is that, 
once the question is rephrased, the answer is “No”. In other words, many delusional 
patients do not believe what they prima facie seem to. To use Marcus’s own terminol-
ogy, the belief claim is “retrospectively reviseable”.  
 Let me locate this within Marcus’s work, in a way that should also serve, at least in 
part, to motivate it. In “Rationality and Believing the Impossible” (1983) Marcus uses 
the issue of believing the impossible as a starting point for putting forward her view of 
belief. The central point is as follows. On any view of knowledge, if the subject claims 
to know something, but that something turns out to be false, then the knowledge 
claim must be revised: the subject can only truly be said to have thought to have known, 
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to have merely thought to have had knowledge; so far, so uncontroversial. However, on 
Marcus’s view of belief, a belief claim turns out to need revision in just this way, not, 
however, if what is believed turns out to be false (or, strictly speaking, to not “obtain”, 
since she takes states of affairs to be the proper objects of beliefs, and not sentential 
entities), but if it turns out to be impossible. In short, we cannot believe the impossi-
ble. And yet we do appear to believe the impossible: mathematicians make mistakes, 
people make mistaken claims of identity or non-identity etc. So Marcus spends a cer-
tain amount of time explaining away, in my view successfully, these appearances. 
 The view of belief that leads to the counter-intuitive claim that we can’t believe the 
impossible is what Marcus calls an “object-centered view of belief”. This she opposes 
to a language-centered, or quasi-linguistic, view of belief. Instead of belief being a rela-
tion to a structured proposition or “thought” (à la Frege) or to a sentence-like repre-
sentation (à la Fodor), she takes belief to be a relation between a subject and a possi-
ble state of affairs.1 In part this is because she finds these entities to be mysterious 
(Frege) or implausible (Fodor). Later, she calls these views “Anti-Naturalist” (Marcus 
1995). On her view one can’t believe the impossible because one cannot stand in the 
belief relation to an impossible state of affairs. 
 However, according to the object-centered view, it is not only when we think that 
we believe something that turns out to be impossible that belief claims are retrospec-
tively revisable. Marcus was aware of this, but only dealt with it very briefly: 
[…] the sentences that we assent to, however sincerely […] are often poor indicators of what we 
believe. These are not cases of deliberate deception, of insincerity, as ordinarily conceived; they have 
to do with those deeper notions of self-deception and false consciousness which I need not go 
into here. (1983, 333-334) 
What I will do in this paper is go into this in more depth by examining delusion. One 
of my claims is that, if we accept Marcus’s view of belief, there are cases of delusion 
where the belief claim is retrospectively revisable in just this sense. Both clinicians, and 
the patients themselves, may think that the patients believe something when in fact 
they don’t. However, this is not because what is “believed” is impossible (it tends not 
to be). It is rather because it isn’t acted upon in the relevant circumstances. The patient 
doesn’t act as if the possible state of affairs in question obtained. And that is central to 
Marcus’s view of belief. 
 However, I am not the first to suggest that delusional patients may not believe 
what they seem to. Doing so falls squarely on one side of the DD (viz. on the side that 
Bayne (2011) calls “anti-doxasticism”). These anti-doxasticists clearly do not subscribe 
to one aspect of the language-centered view that Marcus disliked, namely, that sincere 
verbal assent is an overriding and sufficient indicator of belief. However, they adhere 
to a broader and recently widely held family of views that Marcus, less explicitly, con-
sidered inadequate. I will call these “internal representation-centered” views.   
 Adopting Marcus’s view of belief leads to anti-doxasticism of a very different kind. 
Indeed in light of her view, the very question “Are delusions beliefs?” is unhelpful and 
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would be more accurately expressed as “Does the delusional patient genuinely believe 
what her verbal actions (viz. utterances) suggest?” or “Are her delusional claims accu-
rate (albeit implicit) self-ascriptions of belief?” Such reformulations are, granted, less 
punchy, but they are in no way suggested by the approaches of some of the main par-
ticipants in the DD. 
 I will proceed as follows. I will put forward “The Standard Approach” to the DD 
and show how it subscribes to something like an “internal representation-centered 
view”. I will look at how within this debate, and given this approach, one can sub-
scribe to doxasticism (Bayne and Pacherie 2005, Bortolotti 2009), anti-doxasticism 
(Currie 2000, Currie and Jureidini 2001) and semi-doxasticism (Egan 2008). I will then 
introduce Marcus’s “object-centered” view of belief, and consider how it applies to 
the debate. I will then explore some consequences of this. The two consequences, as 
mentioned, are: 
1. The central question of the DD needs rephrasing. 
2. Some delusional patients don’t believe what they sincerely claim, so, in one 
sense, anti-doxasticism is correct, but it is not anti-doxasticism as traditionally 
understood against the background of the Standard Approach.  
2. The Standard Approach 
The Standard Approach to the DD, although implicit in some of the aforementioned 
views, is very explicitly proposed, and endorsed, by Andy Egan (2008) in the following 
extract. It is such a concise and complete description of the Standard Approach that I 
cite it in full: 
In what follows, I’ll be concerned with characterizing (very partially) the attitude that delusional 
subjects bear to the contents of their delusions. I’m going to assume that the right way to go 
about this is to characterize the roles that particular, token mental representations play in the sub-
ject’s cognitive economy.  So I’ll be assuming that some sort of minimal representational theory 
of mind is correct – that there is a medium of mental representation, and there are discrete repre-
sentational items in the head.  These representational items are operated on in various ways, and 
accessed by various systems, in order to regulate both our behavior and the maintenance of other 
representational items.  Believing, desiring, imagining, and the bearing of propositional attitudes 
in general is a matter of having a representational item with the right kind of content, which plays 
the right kind of role in one’s cognitive economy. (Egan 2008, 262) 
So, the picture that we have here, and that we will abandon later, is that there is a 
“discrete representational item in the head”, the delusional state, and if it plays the 
right kind of role, then it is a belief, and if it plays a different kind of role, then it is a 
different kind of state. The representational state is taken to have the content that is 
expressed in the standard charaterization of the delusion, which in turn corresponds 
to what the patient sincerely asserts. So, for example, in the most commonly talked 
about delusion, and the one that we will focus on, the Capgras delusion, there is the 
representational state that has the content “My father has been replaced by an identi-
cal-looking impostor/stranger”.2 If that state plays a certain role, it is a belief, if it 
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plays another role it is some other state. No surprise, then, that on this view the ques-
tion is phrased as “Are delusions beliefs?” or “Is this delusion a belief?” 
 Accepting this picture for the moment, why might someone think that the repre-
sentational state doesn’t play the right kind of role? In order to say that a given mental 
state, say, a delusion, is not a belief, one has to, (i) get clear on the functional role of 
belief and (ii) show that the delusional state lacks that functional role. This is precisely 
what anti-doxasticists like Currie and his collaborators do. A semi-doxasticist, like 
Egan, claims that the functional role is somewhere between that of belief and imagina-
tion, and therefore calls it “bimagination”. Doxasticists (Bayne and Pacherie 2005, 
Bortolotti 2009) either claim that the functional role is that of belief, or close enough, 
or that “the belief” has somehow been “compartmentalized” (viz. it is a belief that has 
somehow been prevented for playing the role that it otherwise would (e.g. Bayne 
2011)). As you can see, it is at least implied, and at most explicitly asserted, that a be-
lief is a kind of thing, namely, an internal representation that plays a certain role. But 
before seeing what happens when we adopt Marcus’s view of belief, let’s look more 
closely at why, within the Standard Approach, delusions might not be beliefs. 
3. Why might delusions not be beliefs? 
As I said, the main proponents of the anti-doxastic position are Gregory Currie and 
his collaborators (Currie 2000, Currie and Jureidini 2001, Currie and Ravenscroft 
2002). Their view comprises of two claims: a negative and a positive claim. The nega-
tive claim tells us that delusions aren’t beliefs (Anti-doxasticism). The positive claim 
tells us what kind of representational state delusions are, namely, they are imaginings 
that are mistaken for beliefs (what Bayne and Pacherie 2005 call “The Metacognitive 
View”). Although the positive claim will crop up later, for now let’s focus on the nega-
tive claim.  
 Currie thinks that delusions ought not to be counted as beliefs because they lack 
the right kind of functional role. Since, according to Currie, delusions  
(i) are not supported by evidence in their initial formation,  
(ii) are not open to review in the face of contrary evidence,  
(iii) do not fully guide action, reasoning, or elicit the appropriate emotional re-
sponses, 
they should not be counted as beliefs at all, and, as just mentioned, should be counted 
rather as imaginings that are mistaken by the subject for beliefs. This mistake, which 
gives rise to a false second-order belief, accounts for the sincere delusional assertion. 
As Currie and Jureidini put it: 
Imaginings seem just the right things to play the role of delusional thoughts; it is of their nature 
to co-exist with the beliefs they contradict, to leave their possessors unwilling to resolve the in-
consistency, and to be immune to conventional appeals to reason and evidence. (Currie and     
Jureidini 2001, 160)  
 The claim that delusions aren’t beliefs, can, in principle, be opposed on the basis of 
two different kinds of considerations: 
A. Conceptual – you can disagree with the functional role that Currie and co. 
claim is essential to belief. 
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B. Empirical – you can disagree that, as a matter of fact, the delusional state ac-
tually fails to exhibit this functional role. 
 B-type considerations would ideally require a fully fleshed-out story concerning the 
aetiology of the delusion and what the deluded subjects are like. Note also that a cri-
tique could clearly make use of both A and B-type considerations, both disagreeing 
with the functional role of belief, and with the portrayal of the delusion or the deluded 
subject.  
 People with doxastic leanings often respond with B-type considerations. To (i) 
they respond that delusions may be based on evidence of a sort, namely, on strange 
experiences (e.g. lack of affective response to familiar faces in the case of the Capgras 
delusion, cf. Maher 1974, Ellis and Young 1990).3 In response to (iii) they claim that, 
although delusions often fail to generate the kinds of actions and emotional responses 
one might expect, the Capgras delusion (for example) leads to violence against the im-
postor in 18% of cases, and sometimes of a particularly gruesome sort. Granted, it is 
much harder to explain away (ii) since the delusions are (and some, including the 
DSM, say by definition) highly resistant to correction in the face of contrary evidence. 
However, perhaps one can claim that the experiential evidence in favour of the delu-
sion is so strong that this resistance to correction is not irrational since the experience 
trumps all possible testimony; we just don’t know how weird these subjects’ experi-
ences are (see Reimer 2009). But in any case, these are all descriptive, B-type, issues 
about what these patients are actually like. Putting aside for the moment what these 
patients are like, what would any case have to be like in order to qualify, or fail to qual-
ify, as a case of belief? Does a mental state really have to satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii) to 
count as a belief? In other words, what is belief essentially? 
 One philosopher, Lisa Bortolotti (2009), has recently devoted an entire book (Delu-
sions and Other Irrational Beliefs) to defending doxasticism, and her argument has focused 
on the functional role of the states we call beliefs, namely, on A-type considerations. 
She claims that all of (i), (ii) and (iii) are too strict, and that many states that we are 
happy to call beliefs (e.g. scientific and religious beliefs) infringe them. Her tactic is to 
present the anti-doxasticist with a dilemma: if we are to deny belief-status to delusions, 
then we are going to have to do the same for many states that, intuitively, we are hap-
py to call beliefs. However, note that an implicit premise in this argument is that deny-
ing belief-status to these non-pathological states—states that we are, on an everyday 
basis, happy to call beliefs—is too great a theoretical cost. This rests on a conserva-
tism with regard to everyday belief attribution, which is in direct conflict with Mar-
cus’s “revisionary” approach. We have seen that Marcus is happy to tell us of all sorts 
of instances where we regularly attribute beliefs to people, but they, strictly speaking, 
aren’t really believing.4 
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 Now, when should one tend towards conservatism and when should one tend to-
wards revisionism when analyzing a term? Well, if the term is a natural-kind term, or 
of fundamental theoretical importance, there are very good reasons (and precedents) 
for revisionism. Marcus clearly thought that belief, in the most interesting philosophi-
cal sense, is something both theoretically interesting and fundamental.5 As a result, we 
should be revisionists about belief. It’s not for nothing that she explicitly called her 
paper “Some Revisionary Proposals about Beliefs and Believing”, or that she started 
her exposition of her view of belief by making the highly controversial claim that peo-
ple can’t believe impossibilities. Intuitively people do believe impossibilities, for exam-
ple, every time they make false claims of non-identity (believing that Bruce Wayne is 
not Batman is not, according to Marcus, a false belief. It’s not a belief at all). In deny-
ing this, she was being deeply revisionist. 
 It is with this is mind that I present Marcus’s view of belief. 
4. Marcus’s Object-Centred View of Belief 
Perhaps the clearest way of presenting Marcus’s view of belief is in terms of the views 
that she opposes. One can make out two related, but dissociable, such views:  
Language-centered accounts:  Belief is a relation to linguistic entities. In particular, 
“sincere, reflective, non-conceptually-confused” (1983, 333) linguistic assent is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition for belief. 
Internal representation-centered accounts: Belief consists in having a certain internal 
representation that plays a certain role. 
The former is the one that she most clearly opposes (see especially “The Anti-
naturalism of Some Language Centered Accounts of Belief” (1995)). However, she 
opposes the latter too, and this is implicitly seen in her positive formulation of a non-
language-centered account. Of these two views, one can consistently hold both or ei-
ther. Namely, one can think of linguistic assent as being central to belief, and as being 
the expression of (“giving voice to”) an internal representational state (viz. the belief) 
(Marcus seems to attribute this to Ramsey). Or one can think of linguistic assent as 
being crucial to belief, but be neutral, or even skeptical, about internal representations 
(I’d interpret Davidson in this way). Or one can think of linguistic assent (in public 
language) as not being necessary for belief, but insist that belief is a matter of having 
an internal representational state that plays the right functional role (Fodor, and many 
others, seem to hold this). It is this commitment to internal representations (which we 
saw so clearly in the passage quoted from Egan 2008) that is at the heart of the Stand-
ard Approach to the DD, and to the question “Are delusions beliefs?”  
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4.1. Marcus’s Critique of Language-Centered Accounts: Belief without Language 
 In all three of her main papers on belief (1983, 1990, 1995), Marcus uses the intui-
tion that non-human animals have beliefs, namely, that there can be belief without 
language, as a springboard from which to critique language-centered accounts. As she 
is well aware, she is in good company in holding this, and cites Hume: “[…] no truth 
appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow’d with thought and reason 
aswell as men” (Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature quoted in Marcus 1995). Although 
Hume finds this to be such an “evident truth” that it doesn’t warrant illustration or 
argument, Marcus gives us a nice example of her own: 
 A subject, call him ‘Jean,’ and his dog, call him ‘Fido,’ are stranded in a desert. Both are be-
having as one does when one needs and desires a drink. What appears to be water emerges into 
view. It is a mirage […] Both hurry toward it.  
 On what ground can we deny Fido a desire to drink, a belief that there is something potable 
there? […] 
 The important kernel of truth in such a linguistic view is that arriving at a precise verbal de-
scription of another’s beliefs and desires is difficult, and especially so when the attribution cannot 
be verbally confirmed by the subject. We will not go far wrong in attributing thirst to the dog 
Fido, or the belief that there is the appearance of something potable. Whether we can attribute to 
the dog the recognition of water would depend in part on whether dogs can select water from 
other liquids to roughly the extent that we can. That is an empirical question. (1990, 134-135) 
In essence, the view is as follows. Many animals exhibit autonomous goal-directed be-
haviour, and use their sensory and cognitive apparatus to inform themselves about the 
world. Language, as a public, communicative, symbolic medium is certainly vital for 
belief attribution, but not for belief per se. Our attributions will be accurate to the extent 
that they capture the animal’s perspective. As a result, it is much easier to attribute be-
liefs to other human beings, not only because they can correct us, but also because 
their perspective is more likely to resemble our own. However, in using a less fine-
grained content ascription with animals (“something drinkable” instead of “water”) we 
minimize our risk of getting it wrong. 
 Language is not only useful for attributing belief, but can supplement the kinds of 
beliefs we can have. The simplest way in which this occurs, is in enabling us to have 
beliefs that have linguistic entities in their content. I can, for example, believe that the 
utterance “This poem has a synecdoche in it” is true, without yet knowing what a syn-
ecdoche is.6 Our linguistic abilities may also help us in having other kinds of beliefs 
that are closed to non-language users: beliefs about modality, about the distant future, 
about mistakes, commitments, second-order beliefs etc. But that does not mean that 
without language, there cannot be belief. To claim this, and thereby a discontinuity be-
tween humans and non-human animals (and indeed pre-lingual infants), is, as Marcus 
rightly states, “anti-naturalistic”.  
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4.2. Marcus’s Implicit Critique of Internal Representations 
What if one grants that non-human animals have beliefs, but that belief is still lan-
guage-like? Animals may not have a public language, but, if they are cognitively sophis-
ticated enough to believe, they have a “language of thought” (Fodor 1975). Others 
have spent far more time directly criticizing Fodor’s position (e.g. Dennett 1981). 
Marcus, on the other hand, doesn’t so much criticize the Fodorian view, as bypass it. 
Marcus asks, on Fodor’s view, “what would count evidentially in the attribution of an 
unconscious belief to an agent. Is it unconscious assent to a sentence in mentalese?” 
(1990, 138) Presumably, from the way in which this comes at the end of a paragraph 
and she swiftly moves on, answering that question in the affirmative strikes her as im-
plausible. 
 Directly engaging with a Fodorian view is bound to be difficult if one finds that it 
misses the point. We have no good reason to postulate discrete representational vehi-
cles that correspond to beliefs. Doing so misunderstands the very nature of belief. 
Even if human beings, and animals, happen to have a language of thought, we can easi-
ly imagine beings that exhibit autonomous goal-direct behaviour and react intelligently 
to their environment in the service of these goals, without anything like a language of 
thought. These beings would clearly still be believers.7 One might retort that there 
must be internal representations of some sort, even if they need not be language-like. 
They could be, for example, map-like (e.g. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996)).8 But 
tweaking the format also misses the point. There are perhaps all sorts of ways that a 
unified system can be enabled to take the world to be a certain way. And, insofar as 
the system can be wrong about how the world is, we might say that there is represen-
tation “going on”. But that does not mean that there are things in the head called rep-
resentations that correspond to beliefs. Belief is not that which enables a system to 
take the world to be a certain way, but is the phenomenon of taking the world to be a 
certain way itself, and we can think about that without any commitment to internal rep-
resentations at all. 
 Marcus’s positive view cuts to the philosophical chase. Belief is not, at least not es-
sentially, a relation to a sentence (although it can be a relation to a state of affairs 
which contains a sentence), or to an internal representation (of whatever format), but 
rather to a possible (though not necessarily actual) state of affairs. The most relevant 
states of affairs will usually be those that are in the subject’s egocentric space, whether 
                                                      
7 Indeed perhaps the best treatment of the Fodorian view is to take a historian’s viewpoint. The language 
of thought hypothesis arose amidst advancements in computer science and solid symbol systems, and 
a related and ill-founded optimism that matter (the brain) could be given mind in a way analogous to 
the way in which computers were enabled to perform intelligent tasks, namely, by rule-guided opera-
tions on concretely stored internal representations. Even bracketing the question of the essential na-
ture of belief, the computationalist paradigm has been shown, firstly, to not be the only way of get-
ting matter to be intelligent (see e.g. Connectionist approaches), and, secondly, to not be a good imi-
tation of human intelligence (e.g. it doesn’t account for learning). 
8 Egan leaves this possibility open: “This sort of view takes no stand on just what the representations are 
like, so, in particular, they needn’t be like sentences. They might be more like maps, or  models, or 
something else altogether” (2008, 262). 
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these involve things perceived, or merely taken to be in the vicinity (consider a blind 
person’s cognitive perspective, or your own when you take it to be the case that 
someone is standing behind you).  But we have doxastic commitments to various 
states of affairs obtaining that are not in our spatial (or even temporal or, indeed, 
modal vicinity). I can be committed to things obtaining far away from me, in the dis-
tant future, to things being likely or unlikely. What it is to be so committed, according 
to Marcus, is to be disposed to act (plan, bet, speak etc.) as if that state of affairs ob-
tained. In her 1995 paper, she puts forward her analysis of belief as follows 
An agent believes that S just in case (1) under agent-centered circumstances such as desires, 
needs, and other psychological states including other believings and (2) external circumstances (3) 
the agent will act as if S obtained, i.e., will act in ways appropriate to S being the case, where S is a 
state of affairs, actual or non-actual. (1995, 126) 
 She calls this a “Dispositional View” but it must be noted that it is identical to the 
earlier “Object-Centered View”. It is simply approaching the matter with different 
theoretical concerns. The relation is fleshed out as a disposition to act, but the relata 
are still possible states of affairs. On such a view you still can’t believe the impossible, 
and the appearance of believing the impossible is explained away in terms of disposi-
tions towards states of affairs that contain linguistic entities.9 Indeed exactly why one 
can’t believe the impossible becomes clearer: we cannot act (or be disposed to act) as 
if an impossible state of affairs obtained. 
 The best way of fleshing out the finer details of this view is to enumerate some 
important consequences. Some of these consequences contrast illustratively with its 
competitors. The last two consequences contrast with the view of belief implicit in the 
Standard Approach. 
4.3. Some Consequences of the Object-Centered View  
I. The relationship between language and belief: “Actions speak louder than words” 
As we have seen, Marcus takes belief to exist without language, and takes language to 
be only one indicator of belief, and not an over-riding one. In fact, since language is a 
symbolic medium, it can cast distance between the subject a that which is asserted. 
Physical action, on the other hand, cannot do this and therefore is over-riding evi-
dence for belief. Physical actions trump verbal actions because they are more of a 
commitment, and hence more revealing of how the subject takes things to stand in the 
world. If I merely say, “The bridge over the ravine is safe”, I don’t personally risk any-
thing if I am wrong (although I may be misinforming somebody else). If I manifest 
that belief by crossing the bridge, I am risking rather a lot. I can say one thing and 
physically act contrary to what I have said. I can claim the bridge is safe, but refuse to 
use it (even though, we may suppose, it is much in my interest to get across it). But I 
                                                      
9 Namely, when I wrongly say that “Bruce Wayne is not Batman”, I am not expressing a belief that actua-
lly has this content. That would require me to think that an individual is not self-identical, and that 
cannot be believed. I am in fact mistaken about the content of my utterance. And what that utterance 
betrays is my ignorance that, among other things, the linguistic entities, the names “Batman” and 
“Bruce Wayne”, name the same individual. 
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cannot physically act in two opposing ways; I cannot perform an action whose success 
depends on one and the same state of affairs both obtaining and not obtaining.10 To 
put it another way, when people act in ways that conflict with their professed beliefs, 
we take their actions to betray what they “really” believe. As Marcus writes, “actions 
might belie the agent’s words and sincere assenting might not be the priviledged 
marker of believing” (1990, 145).  
 Unlike the language-centered view, this allows, plausibly, that we can discover what 
it is that we really believe: “Verbalization as a necessary condition of believing precludes 
our discovering and then reporting what we believe” (1990, 139). It also allows that 
others may at times be better placed to know one’s beliefs than oneself.  
 All of this conflicts with language-centered views, but not necessarily with the in-
ternal representation-centered views. Currie and Egan, for example, clearly subscribe 
to the latter, but allow that one can be mistaken about one’s beliefs, and that others 
can be better placed to know what one believes. Indeed they claim that they them-
selves are better placed than the delusional subjects that they write about. However, 
note that being wrong about one’s own beliefs in their view amounts to failing to cor-
rectly identify one’s own mental representations. For Marcus, on the other hand, it’s 
simply a failure to be aware of one’s dispositions to action (in the relevant circum-
stances), and to put them accurately into words. 
II. Dispositional and conscious believing 
On Marcus’s view of belief, there is no problem with dispositional beliefs, namely, 
things that you believe but aren’t currently “in mind”, since belief has nothing to do 
with conscious assent of any kind. In fact, dispositional belief just is belief. Conscious, 
occurrent belief is, if anything, what is less obvious. Presumably, conscious belief is a 
belief of which you are conscious. It is becoming aware that you take the world to be 
a certain way (and that will be manifested in your dispositions to action). But a con-
scious belief would then actually give rise to second-order belief: the belief that you 
believe. When I say “I believe that this cup is in front of me” (or “This cup is in front 
of me”) I am actually, through my linguistic action, manifesting my belief that I be-
lieve that the cup is in front of me. Sincere, non-conceptually confused assertion man-
ifests second-order belief, not first-order belief.  
 This also is not in conflict with Currie’s view. In fact, it is Currie’s adherence to 
this that enables the metacognitive view. If I believe that I believe that p, that will suf-
fice to produce a sincere assertion: “p”. Or, to view it from the other angle, if I assert 
sincerely and without “conceptual confusion”, “p”, that is only a sure indication that I 
believe that I believe that p. It is not a sure indication that I believe that p.   
 The following two consequences of Marcus’s view of belief are in conflict with 
Currie’s view since they are not only incompatible with a language-centered view, but 
also with an internal-representation centered view. 
                                                      
10 I can be hesitant, but here I unambiguously manifest the belief that the bridge might break. Whether 
epistemic modals are built into the content or the attitude is a contentious issue that I won’t get into 
here. For a neat and plausible treatment of epistemic modals within the possible worlds framework 
see Yalcin (2011). 
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III. The totality of what a subject believes 
On Marcus’s view, the question “How many beliefs has a subject got?” has no deter-
minate answer. There is perhaps a fact about what is believed, how the subject takes 
the world to be (what Stalnaker (1984) called the belief-set) but that is not the aggre-
gate of individual beliefs: it is holistic. Rather, a subject can be truly said to have “a be-
lief” if a certain belief attribution accurately captures relevant elements of the subject’s 
belief-set. In stark contrast, on a Fodorian view, for example, the number of beliefs I 
have is simply the number of sentences in a language of thought that I have stored in 
my belief box. The totality of what I believe is simply the aggregate of these beliefs. 
The same applies for any view that takes a belief to be a “discrete representational item 
in the head” (see Egan 2008, quoted above), whether it is language-like or not.  
 To put it another way, on Marcus’s view, what is believed has theoretical primacy 
over discrete things we call beliefs. If you look carefully, she almost never writes about 
a belief, or beliefs. She prefers to talk about belief and believing.11 And indeed when 
she pluralizes belief, she writes “believings” not “beliefs” (e.g. see her “Dispositional 
View”, quoted above). Belief (believing) is a phenomenon that subjects exhibit, it is 
not a thing that they have.  
IV. Rationality as Coherence, not Consistency 
Any view that takes beliefs to be discrete and sentential will derive the laws of ration-
ality from those of logical consistency. Beliefs, like well-formed sentences, will be at-
tributed logical properties like “consistent, contradictory, logically true, or related by 
deducibility and the like” (1990, 138). 
 Marcus, on the other hand, in taking belief to not be discrete or sentential, thinks 
of rationality in terms of coherent action of both physical and linguistic varieties. She 
speaks of “the irrationality of the subject who sincerely avows that S or holds ‘S’ true, 
yet his non-verbal actions belie it” (1990, 138). Earlier she states, in a way that will be 
crucial to our examination of some delusional patients, 
We will say that an agent is perfectly rational if all the behavioural indicators of belief are “coher-
ent” with one another. We may say of someone who avows that he loves another, yet  treats cru-
elly the one he claims to love […] that his behaviour is incoherent, “dissonant”, that he is being 
irrational. (1983, 334) 
5. Downstream Idiosyncracies and “Incoherence” 
Let us return to the functional idiosyncrasies (viz. i-iii above) that Currie pointed out. 
These divide into “upstream” and “downstream” idiosyncrasies. That delusions are 
not supported by evidence in their initial formation, and not responsive to review in 
the face of contrary evidence, are upstream idiosyncrasies (in the sense that in at-
tempting to correct the delusion, you are providing input for judgment). That they 
don’t guide action or subsequent reasoning, or elicit emotional responses, is a down-
stream idiosyncrasy (they are consequences of the subject’s beliefs). 
                                                      
11 A very clear illustration of this is in the titles of her three main papers on belief: “Rationality and Belie-
ving the Impossible”, “Some Revisionary Proposals About Belief and Believing”, “The Anti-naturalism 
of Some Language Centered Accounts of Belief”.  
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 On Marcus’s object-centered, dispositional view, it seems doubtful whether any 
upstream idiosyncrasies prevent something from being a case of belief. Although it 
seems plausible that upstream issues answer questions about whether something is 
good or bad believing, e.g. questions concerning epistemic evaluation regarding 
whether it is warranted or justified, it is less clear whether they are relevant to whether 
it is to qualify as believing at all. In other words, these upstream issues about sensitivi-
ty to evidence describe the functional role of good belief, not belief tout court.  
 What interests us in determining whether something is a case of believing is 
whether an organism takes the world to be a certain way, takes a certain state of affairs 
to obtain, and if it does, what that state of affairs is and how best to characterize it. It 
is not strictly relevant (although it is clearly an interesting question) how it is that the 
organism came to have this belief. Indeed the idea of a mad scientist manipulating 
your brain so as to “implant” a certain belief (a disposition to action) is not prima fa-
cie ruled out by our concept of belief. This would be a prime case of unjustified, un-
supported belief, but nonetheless it would count as belief, for example, if the subject 
were disposed to act upon it in the relevant circumstances.  
 The consequence that this has for the question of whether delusions are beliefs is 
clear. Contrary to the claims of Currie and Egan, if we want to claim that delusional 
patients don’t really believe what they assert, it is not to resistance in the face of con-
tradictory evidence, or to lack of supporting evidence during formation, that we 
should turn. This tells us whether they are believing badly (and actually presupposes 
that they are believing). Rather, we need to show that the delusional patient is, all things 
considered, failing to act or reason in accordance with her professed beliefs. In other 
words, we need to demonstrate “incoherence” in Marcus’s sense, on the part of the 
subject. Only then should we say that she doesn’t truly believe what she appears to. 
The delusional patient would then be (but for very different reasons) like a boss who 
claims that he believes in the equality of the sexes, but then goes on to employ a de-
monstrably sexist hiring policy. In short, we need to find downstream idiosyncrasies, 
such as a disparity between action and utterance. The fact that delusions are unsup-
ported (viz. i) and are resistant to counter-evidence (viz. ii) cannot serve to rob them 
of belief-status. 
6. Towards a different anti-doxasticism  
Now let’s turn to the patients. Do they display the “incoherence” that Marcus speaks 
of? Do they fail to act and reason in accordance with their claims? It is generally ac-
cepted that Capgras patients often fail to show concern for the replaced loved one. 
Patient DS (Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997) for example, exhibits a striking lack of 
concern for the welfare or whereabouts of his real father. Speaking of his father’s im-
postor, he calmly says: “He’s a nice guy, doctor, but he’s not my father” (p. 438). 
Granted, it is not always the case that no concern is shown for the replaced loved one. 
However, there is still the problem of how fleeting this concern is. Lucchelli and 
Spinnler (2007) give us the case of patient “Fred” and his wife “Wilma” (both, of 
course, fictitious names): 
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On another occasion, he urged her [his wife, Wilma] to go with him to report Wilma’s disappear-
ance. Most of the times, however, he was quite pleased to see her as the “double” Wilma and ad-
dressed her in a very gentle way. His wife [viz. Wilma] described his manner as “courting as when 
we were dating” (189, emphasis added). 
So, although Fred occasionally acted as if his wife was missing, he was mostly perfect-
ly happy with the double Wilma. But if the double Wilma, isn’t the “real” Wilma, then 
where is the real Wilma? Surely these are not the actions one expects from a man who 
asserts that his wife, whom he loved very much, is missing.  
 Just as it is partly constitutive, for example, of your believing that something is 
deadly poisonous that you should refrain from eating it if you want to stay alive, so it 
seems to be partly constitutive of your believing that a loved one has been replaced by 
an impostor that you should be concerned for the welfare or whereabouts of the 
loved one in question. One might say that if you are not concerned then it either can’t 
be a “loved one” that you believe is missing (and here there are two possibilities: ei-
ther you don’t really believe that it is that person that’s missing, or you can’t have loved 
them very much), or you can’t really believe that they are missing (i.e. it is some other 
attitude that falls short of belief, like imagining). In other words, you can locate the 
deviance at the level either of content or of attitude. Currie does the latter and that is 
why he proposes that delusions are actually imaginings mistaken by the subject for be-
liefs (his “metacognitive view”).  
 The crucial point is therefore that, although that utterance, however sincere, is not 
a guaranteed indicator of belief, on the Standard Approach it must be explained in 
terms of some other discrete representational state. For Currie this is an imagining, 
whereas for Egan it is a sui generis state, a “bimagining”. If that utterance doesn’t give 
voice to a belief, it must be giving voice to something else.  
 But on Marcus’s object-centred view, such a claim would be confusing. Linguistic 
behaviour has no special status. I can utter all sorts of things that don’t correspond to 
anything in my mental economy, just as when I wave my arms about, that doesn’t cor-
respond to a mental state. Furthermore, it seems that, aside from being a multifarious 
thing (propositional, imagistic etc), imagination is categorically different from belief as 
Marcus conceives of it. Unlike believing, imagining is episodic and conscious; you 
don’t have dispositional or unconscious imaginings. Furthermore, sometimes we can 
come to believe on the basis of an imaginative episode. Imagination can be input for 
judgment. Consider the following exchange between a hallucinating subject and his 
friend. 
— Why are you cowering in the corner?  
— Because there’s a Lion in the room 
— No there isn’t; you’re just imagining it. 
Here the subject both imagines and believes, or rather, believes on the basis of an im-
aginative episode. They are not exclusive states of the same kind. 
 
 
Sam WILKINSON 
Theoria 78 (2013): 421-436 
434 
 As a result of these categorical differences between belief and imagination it is con-
fused to ask whether a state is a belief or an imagining. Nor should we, like Egan 
(2008), say that it is somewhere in between (a “bimagining”). Rather, we want to know 
what is believed, what state of affairs the subject takes to obtain, as manifested in dis-
positions to action.  
 Now, some people might say, “Look, there has to be more to belief than mere dis-
positions to action, since there are states that fall short of belief, but which have simi-
lar behavioural consequences.” Note, however, that the objector is confusing the indi-
viduation conditions of action and mere behaviour. Actions aren’t simply endogenous 
bodily movements. You individuate actions by their goals or intentions. Part of what 
makes something imagination or make-believe, rather than belief, is not, as Currie 
emphasizes, that it’s not responsive to epistemic reasons, but rather that the action on 
the basis of which you ascribe the merely imaginative episode in question is different 
from the action on the basis of which you would ascribe a state of believing (even if 
the behaviour is superficially the same). An actor on stage who runs away from some-
thing dangerous in the play doesn’t believe that he is in danger, but rather believes that 
he is acting in a play, wants to give the audience the impression of being in danger, 
and that this is how that’s done. He therefore isn’t literally performing the action of 
running away from danger, however convincing he may be in his acting. 
 If a Capgras patient were to frantically call the police, and insist on the absence of 
her loved ones, insist in desperation that her claims be taken more seriously, this 
abundantly indicates that she takes herself to inhabit a world where her parents are 
missing. If this belief is resistant to correction, or not formed on the basis of good ep-
istemic reasons, it’s still a belief. Sure, it’s an epistemically bad, ill-founded belief, but it’s 
still a belief and, indeed, that evaluation presupposes that what we are talking about is 
belief.   
 So, to sum up, not only is Marcus’s view of the nature of belief very different from 
that which is implicit in the Standard Approach, it also means that different considera-
tions are taken into account when it comes to deciding whether a given case is a case 
of belief. In particular, upstream considerations do not matter for an object-centered, 
dispositional view. What matters is how the subject takes the world to be, not how she 
came to take the world to be that way. Furthermore, when there is incoherence of the 
sort that prevents us from ascribing belief on the basis of the subject’s assertions, 
there is no need to think that there is some other state with that content, some under-
lying representational state that isn’t belief. All we can say is that the patient doesn’t 
really take the world to be the way suggested by her utterances. The subject is per-
forming an inaccurate self-ascription. What causes the utterances, and what prevents 
them from being acted upon, is an interesting, but ultimately empirical, question. 
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7. Conclusion 
If we adopt Marcus’s view of belief, we no longer ask, as the Standard Approach does, 
“Is this discrete representational state a belief, or is it something else?” Rather, we ask 
“What is believed?”, “How does the patient take things to stand in the world?” From 
this perspective, the philosophically interesting problem with delusional patients is not 
only that we find it hard to understand how it is that they come to make the claims 
that they do (these upstream considerations are what make us call them delusional, 
what makes us say that their assertions are bad assertions, and if believed would be bad 
belief) but also that we sometimes find it hard to understand how they actually take 
the world to be.12 They sometimes claim one thing, and act in a way that is not coher-
ent with what they claim. This gets to the heart of what is really perplexing about de-
lusional patients, and why we can’t simply read what they believe off their assertions. 
The question of whether a discrete representational state, “the delusion”, is “a belief” 
comes with a great deal of theoretical baggage that Marcus would have found implau-
sible. 
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